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Abstract
In the matching with contract literature, three well-known conditions (from stronger to
weaker): substitutes, unilateral substitutes (US), and bilateral substitutes (BS) have proven
very critical both in theory and practice. This paper aims to deepen our understanding of
them by separately axiomatizing the gap between BS and the other two. We first introduce a
new “doctor separability” condition (DS) and show that BS, DS, and irrelevance of rejected
contracts (IRC) are equivalent to US and IRC. Due to Hatfield and Kojima (2010) and
Aygu¨n and So¨nmez (2012), we know that US, “Pareto separability” (PS), and IRC are the
same as substitutes and IRC. This along with our result implies that BS, DS, PS, and
IRC are equivalent to substitutes and IRC. All of these results are given without IRC
whenever hospitals have preferences.
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1 Introduction
Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) introduce a matching with contracts framework which ad-
mits the standard two-sided matching, package auction, and the labor market model of Kelso
and Crawford (1982) as special cases.1 They adopt the substitutes condition in the matching
(without contracts) literature (see Roth and Sotomayor (1990)) to their rich setting and show
the existence of a stable allocation whenever contracts are substitutes. If hospital choices
are not necessarily generated by certain preferences, on the other hand, Aygu¨n and So¨nmez
(2013) show that an irrelevance of rejected contracts condition (IRC) is also needed.2
While the substitutes and IRC conditions grant the existence of a stable allocation, Hat-
field and Kojima (2008) demonstrate that the former is not necessary. Hatfield and Kojima
(2010) then introduce a weaker bilateral substitutes (BS) condition guaranteeing the exis-
tence of a stable allocation. Similar to Aygu¨n and So¨nmez (2013), if hospital choices are not
necessarily induced by preferences, Aygu¨n and So¨nmez (2012) reveal that IRC is needed
in addition to BS. While BS and IRC together is sufficient for the existence, it is weak
in that many well-known properties of stable allocations in the standard matching problem
do not carry over to the matching with contracts setting under them. Among others, for
instance, the doctor-optimal stable allocation3 fails to exist. In order to restore at least
some of properties, Hatfield and Kojima (2010) introduce a stronger unilateral substitutes
condition (US),4 and the existence of the doctor-optimal stable allocation is obtained under
both US and IRC. Moreover, the cumulative offer process of Hatfield and Milgrom (2005)
(henceforth, COP ), which is a generalization of Gale and Shapley (1962)’s deferred accep-
tance algorithm, collapses to the doctor proposing deferred acceptance algorithm. With
an additional law of aggregate demand condition of Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) (hence-
1Echenique (2012) shows that matching with contract problem can be embedded into Kelso and Crawford
(1982)’s labor market model under a substitutes condition.
2In the many-to-many matching context (without contracts), Blair (1988) and Alkan (2002) use this
condition. The latter refers to it as “consistency”.
3The doctor-optimal stable allocation is the anonymously preferred stable allocation by all doctors to
any other stable allocation.
4US is still weaker than the substitutes condition.
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forth, LAD),5 Hatfield and Kojima (2010) recover the strategy-proofness6 (indeed group
strategy-proofness)7 of the doctor-optimal stable rule, and a version of so called “rural hos-
pital theorem”.8 Besides, they also show that the doctor-optimal stable allocation is weakly
Pareto efficient for doctors.9 While US and IRC grant the doctor-optimal stable allocation,
the set of stable outcomes still does not form a lattice. Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) obtain
lattice structure under the substitutes (and IRC) condition.
Given that many well-known properties are restored by strengthening BS to US or sub-
stitutes, it is important to understand relations between them. While Hatfield and Kojima
(2010) and Aygu¨n and So¨nmez (2012) clarify the difference between US and substitutes
through axiomatizing the gap between them, such an analysis is yet to be done for the dif-
ference between them and BS. In this study, we pursue it and separately axiomatize the gap
between BS and the other two. To this end, we introduce a doctor separability (henceforth,
DS) condition which says that if no contract of a doctor is chosen from a set of contracts,
then that doctor still should not be chosen unless a contract of a new doctor (we refer to a
doctor as new doctor if he does not have any contract in the initially given set of contracts)
becomes available. We then show that US and IRC are equivalent to DS, BS and IRC.10
Hatfield and Kojima (2010) show that US and “Pareto Separability” (PS) are equivalent to
substitutability. Aygu¨n and So¨nmez (2012) then extend it to a more general setting where
hospital choices are primitive by additionally imposing IRC. This result along with our
axiomatization gives that BS, DS, PS, and IRC are the same as substitutes and IRC.11
As IRC is automatically satisfied whenever hospitals have preferences, all the results are
given without IRC in that case.
5Alkan and Gale (2003) introduce a similar condition they call “size monotonicity” in a schedule matching
setting.
6A mechanism is strategy-proof if no doctor ever has incentive to misreport his preference.
7A mechanism is group strategy-proof if no group of doctors ever benefit from collectively misreporting.
8That is, every doctor and hospital signs the same number of contracts at any stable allocation.
9An allocation is weakly Pareto efficient for doctors if no other allocation is strictly preferred by all
doctors.
10Alva (2014) gives some necessary (not sufficient though) conditions for US and BS to hold.
11Alva (2014) provides another characterization of substitutability by using different properties, which
are not directly related to the currently used ones.
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As summarized above, moving from BS to US or substitutes brings important properties.
Indeed, it is not only restricted to already mentioned ones above. In a recent study, Afacan
(2014) shows that COP is both population and resource monotonic under US and IRC,
and it respects doctors’ improvements with an additional LAD. The theoretical appeal of
understanding the difference between US and BS therefore is clear. In addition to that, it
has a practical advantage. There is an important recent surge in the real-life market with
contracts design literature including So¨nmez and Switzer (2013); So¨nmez (2013); Kominers
and So¨nmez (2013); and Aygu¨n and Bo (2014). These papers show that US and BS condi-
tions are also critical for the practical market design.12 By deepening our understanding of
these three substitutes conditions and providing an alternative way (possibly easier in many
cases) of checking US and substitutes conditions, this note has a practical appeal as well.
2 Model and Results
There are finite sets D and H of doctors and hospitals, and a finite set of contracts X.
Each contract x ∈ X is associated with one doctor xD ∈ D and one hospital xH ∈ H. Given
a set of contracts X ′ ⊆ X, let X ′D = {d ∈ D : ∃ x ∈ X ′ with xD = d}. Each hospital h has
a choice function Ch : 2
X → 2X defined as follows: for any X ′ ⊆ X:
Ch(X
′) = {X ′′ ⊆ X ′ : (x ∈ X ′′ ⇒ xH = h) and (x, x′ ∈ X ′′, x 6= x′ ⇒ xD 6= x′D)}.
Definition 1. Contracts satisfy irrelevance of rejected contracts (IRC) for hospital h if, for
any X ′ ⊂ X and z ∈ X \X ′, if z /∈ Ch(X ′ ∪ {z}) then Ch(X ′) = Ch(X ′ ∪ {z}).
Definition 2. Contracts are bilateral substitutes (BS) for hospital h if there do not exist
contracts x, z ∈ X and a set of contracts Y ⊆ X such that xD, zD /∈ YD, z /∈ Ch(Y ∪ {z}),
and z ∈ Ch(Y ∪ {x, z}).
12Their respective contracts satisfy either BS or US, yet not substitutes.
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Definition 3. Contracts are unilateral substitutes (US) for hospital h if there do not exist
contracts x, z ∈ X and a set of contracts Y ⊆ X such that zD /∈ YD, z /∈ Ch(Y ∪ {z}), and
z ∈ Ch(Y ∪ {x, z}).
Below introduces our new condition.
Definition 4. Contracts are doctor separable (DS) for hospital h if, for any Y ⊂ X and
x, z, z′ ∈ X\Y with xD 6= zD = z′D, if xD /∈ [Ch(Y ∪{x, z})]D, then xD /∈ [Ch(Y ∪{x, z, z′})]D.
In words, DS says that if a doctor is not chosen from a set of contracts in the sense that
no contract of him is selected, then that doctor still should not be chosen unless a contract
of a new doctor (that is, doctor having no contract in the given set of contracts) becomes
available. For practical purposes, we can consider DS capturing contracts where certain
groups of doctors are substitutes.13
Theorem 1. Contracts are US and IRC if and only if they are BS, DS, and IRC.
Proof. “If” Part. Let contracts be BS and DS satisfying IRC. Moreover, let Y ⊂ X and
x ∈ X such that xD /∈ YD and x /∈ Ch(Y ∪ {x}). We now claim that x /∈ Ch(Y ∪ {x, z})
for any z ∈ X as well. If zD /∈ YD, then by BS, the result follows. Let us now assume that
zD ∈ YD. Then, we can write Y = Y ′∪{z′} for some z′ where z′D = zD. This means that x /∈
Ch(Y
′∪{x, z′}), and since xD /∈ YD, it in particular implies that xD /∈ [Ch(Y ′∪{x, z′})]D. By
DS then, we have xD /∈ [Ch(Y ′∪{x, z′, z})]D; in other way of writing, xD /∈ [Ch(Y ∪{x, z})]D.
Hence in particular, x /∈ Ch(Y ∪ {x, z}).
“Only If” Part. Let contracts be US satisfying IRC. By definition, they are BS
as well. In order to show that they are also DS, let xD /∈ [Ch(Y ∪ {x, z})]D. We define
Y ′ = Y \ {x′ ∈ Y : xD = x′D and x 6= x′}. By IRC, Ch(Y ∪ {x, z}) = Ch(Y ′ ∪ {x, z}).
Let us now add a new contract z′ where zD = z′D. By US, x /∈ Ch(Y ′ ∪ {x, z, z′}). If
x ∈ Ch(Y ∪{x, z, z′}), then by IRC, it has to be that Ch(Y ∪{x, z, z′}) = Ch(Y ′∪{x, z, z′}).
13If xD /∈ [Ch(Y ∪ {x, z})]D, then it means that doctor xD is not chosen. And under DS, he continues
not to be chosen unless a new doctor comes. Hence, we can interpret it as the doctors in the given set of
contracts are substitutes.
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This, however, contradicts x /∈ Ch(Y ′ ∪ {x, z, z′}). Hence, x /∈ Ch(Y ∪ {x, z, z′}). For any
other contract x′ ∈ Y of doctor xD, we can define Y ′ = [Y \{x′}]∪{x}. Then, by above, xD /∈
[Ch(Y
′ ∪ {x′, z})]D (note that Y ′ ∪ {x′, z} = Y ∪ {x, z}). By easily following the same steps
above, we can conclude that x′ /∈ Ch(Y ∪{x, z, z′}) as well. Hence, xD /∈ [Ch(Y ∪{x, z, z′})]D,
showing that contracts are DS.
Remark 1. As BS is weaker than US, Theorem 1 shows that the former does not imply
DS. Moreover, DS does not imply BS either. Let X = {x, y, z} where xD 6= yD 6= zD and
xH = yH = zH = h. Consider the following choices of hospital h.
Ch({x}) = {x} ; Ch({x, y}) = {y} ; Ch({x, y, z}) = {x, z}
Ch({y}) = {y} ; Ch({x, z}) = {x, z} ; Ch({y, z}) = {y, z}
Ch({z}) = {z}.
We can easily verify that contracts are DS (even satisfying IRC), yet not BS as Ch({x, y}) =
{y} and Ch({x, y, z}) = {x, z}.
Definition 5. Contracts are substitutes for hospital h if there do not exist contracts x, z ∈ X
and a set of contracts Y ⊆ X such that z /∈ Ch(Y ∪ {z}) and z ∈ Ch(Y ∪ {x, z}).
Hatfield and Kojima (2010) introduce the following condition which has proven to be
useful in understanding the difference between US and substitutes.
Definition 6. Contracts are Pareto separable (PS) for hospital h if, for any two distinct
contracts x, x′ with xD = x′D and xH = x
′
H = h, if x ∈ Ch(Y ∪ {x, x′}) for some Y ⊆ X,
then x′ /∈ Ch(Y ′ ∪ {x, x′}) for any Y ′ ⊆ X.
Hatfield and Kojima (2010) show that US and PS are equivalent to substitutes. In
their setting, hospitals have preferences, inducing their choices. Aygu¨n and So¨nmez (2012)
then extend their result to a more general setting where hospital choices are primitive by
additionally imposing IRC. As the latter is more general and relevant to our current setting,
we formally state it below.
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Fact 1 (Aygu¨n and So¨nmez (2012)). Hospital choices are US and PS satisfying IRC if and
only if they are substitutes satisfying IRC.
As a corollary of Theorem 1 and Fact 1 above, we obtain the following characterization.
Corollary 1. Contracts are substitutes satisfying IRC if and only if they are BS, DS, PS
satisfying IRC.
Remark 2. As IRC is automatically satisfied whenever hospital choices are generated
by certain preferences, all of the above results work without IRC in that case.
Remark 3. In this remark, we show that DS and PS are independent of each other.
Let X = {x, x′, y} where xD = x′D 6= yD and xH = x′H = yH = h. Consider the following
choices of hospital h:
Ch({x}) = {x} ; Ch({x, x′}) = {x′} ; Ch({x, x′, y}) = {x, y}
Ch({x′}) = {x′} ; Ch({x, y}) = {x, y} ; Ch({x′, y}) = {x′, y}
Ch({y}) = {y}.
One can easily verify that contracts are DS (even satisfying IRC), yet not PS as
Ch({x, x′}) = {x′} and Ch({x, x′, y}) = {x, y}. For the converse, think of the above same
choices except for Ch({x, y}) = {x} and Ch({x, x′, y}) = {x′, y}. In this case, contracts are
PS (even satisfying IRC), yet not DS due to the right above choices.
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